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A. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
1. The Rules of Practice
In addition to the Administrative Procedure Act,1 which is designed
to provide basic guidelines ensuring procedural due process and basic
fairness to those who appear before federal administrative agencies, the
United States Securities and Exchange Commission2 has promulgated
two separate and distinct sets of rules to govern the procedures discussed
in this paper. These are the Rules of Practice3 and the Rules Relating to
Investigations4 of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
* Member of the Florida Bar and of the firm of Tew, Tew, Rozen & Murray, Miami,
Florida.
** Member of the Editorial Board and Associate Editor, University of Miami Law
Review.
1. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (1970).
2. Hereinafter referred to as the Commission.
3. 17 C.F.R. § 201 (1972). Hereinafter in the text and footnotes a rule of practice
will be referred to as R.P. Thus, for example, rule of practice number 2(b) will be re-
ferred to as R.P. 2(b).
4. 17 C.F.R. § 203 (1972). Hereinafter in the text and footnotes a rule relating to
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2. Who May Practice Before the Commission
Any lawyer admitted to practice before either the highest court in
his state, any of the lower federal courts or the Supreme Court of the
United States may practice before the Commission.' Individuals may ap-
pear pro se and corporations and other associations may appear by and
through an officer or other authorized person.' The Commission has the
power to deny the right to practice before it for reasons of misconduct or
bad character.7
B. THE DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD OF ENFORCEMENT
1. The Fifth Amendment-Immunity Swaps
Like most federal regulatory agencies, the Commission has the power
to compel witnesses to answer questions or produce documents even
though such evidence and testimony may be self-incriminatory. Serious
problems have arisen from this statutory grant of power to compel testi-
mony. One quite annoying question is whether the immunity provided in
exchange for testimony protects the witness from subsequent prosecution
under a state securities statute.'" Recently, the extent of the privilege thus
conferred has been the subject of attack. The statute provides only for
immunity against re-use of the compelled testimony. The "immunity
swap" statute has been held invalid by several courts on the ground that
the granted immunity is not coextensive with the fifth amendment privi-
lege. 11
investigations will be referred to as R.R.I. Thus, for example, rule relating to investiga-
tions number 5 will be referred to as R.R.I. 5. The parallel citations to R.P. and R.R.I.
are from the May 17, 1971, SEC booklet entitled "Rules of Practice and Rules Relating to
Investigations and Code of Behavior Governing Ex Parte Communications Between
Persons Outside the Commission and Decisional Employees."
5. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(b) (1972); R.P. 2(b).
6. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(a) (1972); R.P. 2(a).
7. Schwebel v. Orrick, 153 F. Supp. 701 (D.D.C. 1957), aff'd on other grounds, 251
F.2d 919 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 927 (1958).
8. Prior to December 14, 1970, immunity of witnesses and the privilege against self-
incrimination was governed by § 22(c) of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended 15
U.S.C. § 77v(c) (1964), and § 21(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended
15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1964). However, the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 re-
pealed those subsections and now governs the topic. 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-05 (1970). None-
theless, prior decisional law will most likely continue to be applicable, as the new pro-
visions are quite similar to those they replaced.
9. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970). See also Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948)
(citing 26 statutes conferring such powers on various federal agencies); Brown v. Walker,
161 U.S. 591 (1896).
10. See Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944); United States v. Murdock,
284 U.S. 141 (1931); McNaughton, Self Incrimination under Foreign Law, 45 VA. L. REv.
1299 (1959), and the subsequent commentaries on all of these authorities in Murphy v.
Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964). Murphy and Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179
(1954), make it certain that the compelled testimony cannot be used elsewhere. But see
note 17 infra and accompanying text.
11. In re Kinoy, 326 F. Supp. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); see also In re Korman, 449
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There is no formal procedure which must be followed in claiming the
privilege before the Commission. 12 It may be claimed informally before
the witness has been sworn to testify." However, there are important
conditions which must be met before the immunity takes effect and im-
portant limitations as to the privilege which creates the immunity.
Immunity does not follow from the mere fact of testifying as to mat-
ters which are, in fact, incriminating:
The statute is plain and unambiguous. It requires that a claim
of privilege against self-incrimination must be made by an in-
dividual, and that, thereafter, the individual must be compelled
to testify or to produce records for inspection by the legislative
body. 4
Therefore, testimony given without a claim of privilege against self-in-
crimination under the fifth amendment, and given without compulsion,
creates no immunity from prosecution for the witness.'
The immunity provisions apply only insofar as the witness has a con-
stitutional privilege to assert; that is, the immunity is coterminous with
the privilege.'" The privilege does not extend to corporations or to officers
of corporations insofar as the corporate books and records are con-
cerned.' The only papers protected by the privilege are those that are
the private property of the person claiming the privilege, or at least those
that are in his possession in a purely personal capacity.'8
The federal law as to partnerships is somewhat unsettled. The courts
have upheld the privilege as to a member of a partnership, but have also
indicated that members of large partnerships, having both special and
general partners, might not be entitled to the privilege. 9
The immunity is applicable to a person compelled to testify orally as
to matters contained in corporate books or other records, but not to one
F.2d 32 (7th Cir. 1971). If a "transactional" immunity statute existed, with language
similar to "in any criminal case" as in 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970), an argument founded
upon the supremacy clause could be made in favor of a total, nationwide immunity, and
thus bar prosecutions under state securities statutes.
12. United States v. Eisele, 52 F. Supp. 105 (D.D.C. 1943); United States v. Goodner,
35 F. Supp. 286 (D. Colo. 1940).
13. United States v. Goodner, 35 F. Supp. 286 (D. Colo. 1940).
14. United States v. Abrams, 357 F.2d 539, 549 (2d Cir. 1966).
15. Shaw v. United States, 131 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1942). The fact that immunity
provisions are expressly conditioned upon claiming the privilege makes the rule the same
as that which applies to the fifth amendment itself. See, e.g., Rogers v. United States, 340
U.S. 367 (1951).
16. Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948). It must be noted, however, that the
refusal to testify in noncriminal proceedings has been used to support an inference that
had the witness testified, such testimony would have been adverse to his position. See,
e.g., N. Sims Organ & Co. v. SEC, 293 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1961).
17. Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
18. See, e.g., Essgee Co. of China v. United States, 262 U.S. 151 (1923); In re Verser-
Clay Co., 98 F.2d 859 (10th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 639 (1939).
19. United States v. Linen Serv. Council, 141 F. Supp. 511 (D.N.J. 1956), provides a
good review of the cases in this area.
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asked merely to authenticate such books and records.2" And while a wit-
ness might personally have a privilege that can be exchanged for im-
munity, his privilege does not extend to accounting work papers owned
by his accountant.2' The attorney-client privilege, of course, is honored,
but no accountant-client privilege is recognized,22 regardless of underly-
ing state law. Neither a privilege between broker and customer 23 nor be-
tween banker and depositor24 is available for immunity purposes. The
practice is to honor priest-penitent, doctor-patient, and husband-wife
confidential communications, but foreign bank secrecy laws and related
secrecy statutes will offer no protection from the production of records
relating to securities transactions within the United States.25
Since the federal perjury laws apply to testimony given before the
21Commission, client candor is particularly important so that counsel will
have the best information from which to determine whether to claim the
privilege for his client before allowing him to testify.
It should be noted that while the SEC has the power to compel a
witness to testify by granting immunity, in the author's experience the
SEC attorney taking the deposition is not given the power to grant such
immunity.
2. The Subpoena Power
The Commission has the power to issue subpoenas requiring sworn
testimony and the production of books, records and other documents
which the Commission deems relevant or material to the subject matter
under inquiry.2" This power applies both to named parties to a proceeding
and to third persons.28
To validly issue subpoenas, the Commission need not show violations
or even probable violations of the securities laws.29 And the breadth of a
subpoena duces tecum will not affect its validity so long as it indicates the
subject matter of the inquiry and describes the documents or other rec-
ords so that they may be readily identified.8 0 The determination of the
relevancy, materiality and necessity of evidence and of the need for issu-
20. United States v. Austin-Bagley Corp., 31 F.2d 229 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S.
863 (1929). See also Essgee Co. of China v. United States, 262 U.S. 151 (1923).
21. In re Rashba & Pokart, 271 F. Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
22. Id.
23. McMann v. SEC, 87 F.2d 377 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 684 (1937).
24. See, e.g., Galbraith v. United States, 387 F.2d 617 (10th Cir. 1968).
25. Fontaine v. SEC, 259 F. Supp. 880 (D.P.R. 1966).
26. United States v. Batten, 226 F. Supp. 492 (D.D.C. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 912
(1965).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(b) (1970); 17 C.F.R. § 201.14(b)(1) (1972); R.P. 14(b)(1).
28. McGarry v. SEC, 147 F.2d 389 (10th Cir. 1945).
29. Mines & Metals Corp. v. SEC, 200 F.2d 317 (9th Cir. 1952); Consolidated Mines
v. SEC, 97 F.2d 704 (9th Cir. 1938). See also Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling,
327 U.S. 186 (1946).
30. See, e.g., SEC v. Vacuum Can Co., 157 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330
U.S. 820 (1947).
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ing a subpoena may be delegated to an employee of the Commission.81
This power to issue and enforce subpoenas has been held consistent with
the fourth amendment guarantee against unreasonable search and sei-
zure.
8 2
Any party to a quasi-judicial proceeding may request the officer con-
ducting the proceeding to issue a subpoena, which request will be granted
unless patently oppressive or unreasonable.8 However, the officer may
require that the party requesting the subpoena advance the reasonable
costs of transporting any documents subpoenaed.34 A party whose request
for the issuance of a subpoena has been denied by the officer may appeal
to the Commission.35 A witness subpoenaed by a party may move the
Commission's hearing officer either to quash or to modify a subpoena.86
In the event of a witness's refusal to respond to a subpoena, the
Commission may apply for enforcement of the subpoena to the federal
district court within the jurisdiction in which the witness is found or
resides. 7 Generally, in such an enforcement action, the district court will
grant full remedial relief to the Commission. 8 The failure to obey the
court's order is then punishable as contempt.89 It has been held to be an
abuse of discretion for a district court to only fine a disobedient witness
and to fail to grant any coercive relief designed to force compliance with
the subpoena.4" A witness may not appeal to a federal court to quash a
Commission subpoena, except by way of defending an enforcement pro-
ceeding brought against him by the Commission.4'
C. INVESTIGATIONS
1. Nature and Scope of the Power
The power of the Commission to conduct investigations is similar to
that of a grand jury:
It has a power of inquisition, if one chooses to call it that, which
is not derived from the judicial function. It is more analogous
to the Grand Jury, which does not depend on a case or contro-
31. Woolley v. United States, 97 F.2d 258 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 614 (1938).
32. Newfield v. Ryan, 91 F.2d 700 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 729 (1937);
McMann v. SEC, 87 F.2d 377 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 684 (1937). Of course, a
subpoena could be so oppressive as to violate the fourth amendment. See Hale v. Henkel,
201 U.S. 43 (1906); SEC v. Bourbon Sales Corp., 47 F. Supp. 70 (W.D. Ky. 1942).
33. 17 C.F.R. § 201.14(b)(1) (1972); R.P. 14(b)(1).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. 17 C.F.R. § 201.14(b) (2) (1972); R.P. 14(b)(2).
37. The enforcement section of the Securities Act of 1933 is § 22(b), 15 U.S.C. §
77v(b) (1970).
38. Id.; SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distrib. Co., CCH FED. SFc. L. REP. fr 94,017 (2d
Cir. 1973).
39. Securities Act of 1933 § 22(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77v(b) (1970).
40. Penfield Co. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585 (1947).
41. SEC v. Isbrandtsen, 245 F. Supp. 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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versy for power to get evidence but can investigate merely on
suspicion that the law is being violated, or even just because it
wants assurance that it is not. When investigative and accusa-
tory duties are delegated by statute to an administrative body,
it, too, may take steps to inform itself as to whether there is
probable violation of the law.42
Only the Commission has the power to initiate and conduct investiga-
tions of matters under its jurisdiction. No court may make such an in-
vestigation, and a court is without power to direct the Commission, at the
instance of a private petitioner or on its own motion, to initiate an in-
vestigation.43 No court has injunctive power over any Commission pro-
ceeding or the power to control the conduct of a Commission investiga-
tion.44 However, the Commission is subject to judicial power when it
oversteps its jurisdiction or attempts to extend its power beyond that pro-
vided by law.45 The Commission's decision to undertake an investigation
is merely interlocutory and, thus, is not reviewable in the courts.46
2. Procedure and Practice
There are various sources which may alert the Commission to pos-
sible violations of the federal securities acts. These sources include in-
quiries and complaints of investors and the general public, surprise in-
spections of the books and records required to be kept by those dealing in
securities, and the general surveillance and analysis of fluctuations in
particular stocks which appear not to be the result of known develop-
ments affecting the issuing company or of general market trends.47 In-
vestigations are primarily conducted by the regional offices of the Com-
mission.48 If there is an indication of a violation of the law, the regional
office or the appropriate division of the Commission staff will open an in-
vestigation file and assign a two-man team to investigate the matter. 9
42. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-43 (1950). This language, al-
though written about the Federal Trade Commission, is an excellent statement of the
nature of agency investigatory power.
43. Crooker v. SEC, 161 F.2d 944 (1st Cir. 1947); Webster Eisenlohr, Inc. v. Kalod-
ner, 145 F.2d 316 (3d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 867 (1945).
44. SEC v. Harrison, 80 F. Supp. 226 (D.D.C. 1948). An exception to this rule should
be applied where the Commission has sought an injunction in a district court and then,
during the pendency of such action, tries to initiate a private investigation into matters
raised by the Commission's complaint. The district court should require the Commission to
discover only in compliance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Such a protective
order was entered in SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 766 (D. Ore.
1972).
45. See Newfield v. Ryan, 91 F.2d 700 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 729 (1937),
and cases cited therein at 703-04.
46. SEC v. Andrews, 88 F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1937).
47. 11 H. SowaRns, Businss ORGANIZATIONS [SECURITIES REGULATION] § 1.03[2][b]
(1971) [hereinafter cited as SowARDs].
48. Id.
49. 11A E. GADsBY, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS [SECURITIES REGULATION] § 9.02[l][a]
(1973) [hereinafter cited as GAUsBr].
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The first stage of investigation is informal. No process is issued, no
witnesses are sworn, and no testimony is taken. Witnesses are interviewed
by the investigators of the Commission, who make notes and sometimes
take notarized statements." In this informal stage, neither the person who
complained to the Commission nor those complained of are apprised of
the existence or scope of the investigation."' Even when a formal in-
vestigation is commenced, all proceedings are private.52 This policy of
secrecy is intended to protect those who, although not guilty of any ac-
tionable misconduct, would be seriously injured if it became publicized
that they were somehow involved in a Commission investigation, and also
to obtain the best results. It is the Commission's experience that private
inquiry is more effective, since witnesses will be more candid if they know
that their statements will be kept in strictest confidence."8
Commission examinations in investigations at first may appear to
raise severe Miranda54 problems. However, one circuit court of appeals
has held that such testimony is exempt from the formal warning require-
ments because it is not given while the individual is "in custody."55 Nev-
ertheless, should the Commission formalize a "warning" procedure, fail-
ure to comply with such a rule could lead to suppression of the testi-
mony.58
In addition to the power of secrecy, the Commission also has the
equally effective power to make all such information public.5 7 As a rule,
however, the Commission does not make any information public until
quasi-judicial proceedings are brought. A Commission employee will not
honor any request, even through a subpoena, to furnish information ob-
tained in an investigation, unless the release of such information has been
expressly authorized by the Commission. 8 This right to refuse to divulge
information has been upheld in the federal courts.59
If, as a result of the informal inquiry, the investigators obtain evi-
dence that, in their opinion, indicates the presence of a violation of the
securities laws, they will submit their information to the Commission with
a recommendation that a formal investigation be instituted. If the Com-
mission concurs in this decision, it will issue a formal order authorizing
a formal investigation."0 The purpose of a formal investigation is to both
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. 17 C.F.R. §§ 203.2, 203.5 (1972) ; R.R.I. 2 and 5.
53. Levenson, Administrative Procedures in Connection with Investigations and Hear-
ings Under the Securities Act of 1933, in SECURITiES LAWS & REGULATIONS INSTITUTE 109,
114-15 (H. Sowards ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as Levenson].
54. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
55. Dosek v. United States, 405 F.2d 405 (8th Cir. 1968); see also SEC v. Dott, 302
F. Supp. 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
56. See United States v. Heffner, 420 F.2d 809 (4th Cir. 1970) (IRS).
57. 17 C.F.R. § 203.5 (1972); R.R.I. 5.
58. SowARDs, supra note 47, at § 10.02[11.
59. Appeal of SEC, 226 F.2d 501 (6th Cir. 1955). But see NLRB v. Capitol Fish Co.,
294 F.2d 868 (5th Cir. 1961).
60. SowARws, supra note 47, at § 10.02 [1].
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determine whether there has been a violation of the law and to gather
evidence as to the violation's existence. 61
The formal order defines the scope of the inquiry by specifying
which questions of fact and law are to be investigated. 2 It also designates
the members of the Commission's staff who will be empowered to conduct
the proceedings, issue subpoenas, place witnesses under oath, and take
testimony.6" This formal order is not served upon those under investiga-
tion. However, the rules provide that any witness in a formal investiga-
tion may examine the order upon a request made to the Commission.64
Unless unusual circumstances can be shown, no one outside the Commis-
sion is allowed to retain a copy of this formal order."5
An official transcript and record are made of the proceedings. Such
proceedings are nonpublic, and the record is confidential."
A person subpoenaed to appear in these proceedings has the right to
counsel. 7 If a witness appears without counsel, the officer in charge of the
proceeding will instruct the witness of his right to have counsel, and the
witness will be allowed to obtain counsel if he so desires before he is
sworn in and examined. However, a witness cannot demand that the Com-
mission furnish him with counsel.68
The witness's right to counsel is limited to the following: counsel
may advise the witness before, during and after the examination; counsel
may ask his client questions at the conclusion of the examination to
clarify any of the answers given; and counsel may make summary notes
during the examination solely for the use of his client.69 Counsel for the
witness does not have the right to object to questions, to cross-examine
any other witnesses, or even to be present when other witnesses are
testifying.7"
The Commission's formal investigatory procedures apparently meas-
ure up to due process requirements. In Hannah v. Larche,7' the United
States Supreme Court explained that, pursuant to Greene v. McElroy,72
questions of procedural due process in administrative proceedings were to
be resolved through a two-step analysis: (1) Did the President or Con-
gress authorize the procedures being employed? If so, (2) are such pro-
cedures consistent with the due process clause of the fifth amendment? In
61. Id. at §§ 1.03[2][c], 10.02[1]. See Woolley v. United States, 97 F.2d 258 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 614 (1938), to the effect that this SEC function resembles that
of a grand jury.
62. GADSBY, supra note 49, at § 9.02[2].
63. Id. at § 9.02[l][b].
64. 17 C.F.R. § 203.7(a) (1972) ; R.R.I. 7(a).
65. Id.
66. 17 C.F.R. §§ 203.2, 203.5 (1972) ; R.R.I. 2 and 5.
67. 17 C.F.R. § 203.7(b) (1972) ; R.R.I. 7(b).
68. Boruski v. SEC, 340 F.2d 991 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 917 (1965).
69. 17 C.F.R. § 203.7(c) (1972) ; R.R.I. 7(c).
70. 17 C.F.R. § 203.7(b)-(c) (1972); R.R.I. 7(b)-(c); SEC v. Isbrandtsen, 245 F.
Supp. 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
71. 363 U.S. 420 (1960).
72. 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
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Hannah, the Court analyzed the investigative procedures of the Civil
Rights Commission, which did not provide a right of cross-examination.
After answering the threshold question of authorization affirmatively, the
Court proceeded to find no due process limitations, based upon a distinc-
tion between adjudicative proceedings and investigative proceedings. In
holding that all of the due process essentials of an adjudicatory proceed-
ing were not necessary in a mere investigatory proceeding, the Court, in
the strongest possible dictum, placed the stamp of approval on the Com-
mission's investigative procedures:
Another regulatory agency which distinguishes between adjudi-
cative and investigative proceedings is the Securities and Ex-
change Commission. . . .Although the Commission's Rules
provide that parties to adjudicative proceedings shall be given
detailed notice . . . and a right to cross-examine witnesses
. ..those provisions of the Rules are made specifically inap-
plicable to investigations. .... 73
However, in an appendix to Hannah in which the Supreme Court de-
lineated the investigative procedures of the various agencies, the Court
stated:
It should be noted, however, that the Securities and Exchange
Commission, unlike the Civil Rights Commission, is an adjudica-
tory body, and it may use the information gathered through in-
vestigative proceedings to initiate 'administrative proceedings
... injunction proceedings ... [or] criminal prosecution.'74
Despite the formal strictures placed on counsel, as a matter of prac-
tice the Commission allows the counsel for a witness to state objections to
questions and his reasons for same. Furthermore, especially if a witness
testified to matters which may result in liability, his counsel is allowed a
reasonable opportunity to produce any additional explanatory testimony
or documentary evidence.75
The right to counsel in a formal investigation is further limited by
the "sequestration of witnesses" rule.76 All witnesses are sequestered dur-
ing the examinations, and, unless permitted in the discretion of the officer
in charge, no witness or counsel is permitted to be present during the ex-
amination of any other witness. 7 The officer in charge has the power to
exclude counsel from representing a particular witness if such representa-
tion would infringe on the sequestration rule.78 These rules have created
considerable controversy.
While an official Commission position on sequestration cannot defi-
73. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 446-47 (1960).
74. Id. at 461, 463.
75. Levenson, supra note 53, at 121.
76. 17 C.F.R. § 203.7(b) (1972); R.R.I. 7(b).
77. Id.
78. United States v. Steel, 238 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
1972]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVII
nitely be stated, one high-ranking Commission official states the rationale
for the rule to be as follows:
This rule was designed to minimize the relaying of testimony
from one witness to another witness. For example, an employee
may be reluctant to testify fully when the employer, who is in-
volved in the investigation, provides the same counsel for all em-
ployees. There was concern that choice of counsel by the em-
ployee would be dictated by fear of employer disfavor if counsel
other than that of the employer was retained ...
This rule was not promulgated to infringe upon a witness's
right to counsel. The rule was adopted primarily to permit the
Commission to obtain the truth in investigations. Violations of
the securities laws are often difficult to detect and require exten-
sive investigation. It may be necessary to determine whether or
not individuals are acting in concert. Investigations frequently
are sought to be frustrated by non-cooperation and even sub-
ornation of perjury. The purpose of sequestration could be de-
feated by an attorney advising witnesses as to the testimony
which had been given by others. This rule is also regarded as a
form of regulation of the practice of the Commission bar."9
This rule has been upheld as not denying a witness the right to coun-
sel of his choice, so long as the rule is applied reasonably. 0 In SEC v.
Higashi,"' the appellate court laid down this "rule of reasonableness,"
while finding that the Commission's investigation officer had exceeded his
discretion by prohibiting the counsel who represented a company and
certain of its directors from representing another director.
A witness who is compelled to submit data or other evidence or
testimony has the absolute right to inspect his testimony, and may request
and receive, upon payment of the cost thereof, a transcript of his testi-
mony. However, the Commission, for good cause, may deny his request
for a copy of his testimony.82 A staff attorney usually notifies counsel for
the witness when his testimony has been transcribed, so that the witness
may review the testimony and submit any corrections or additions thereto.
This addendum is then made a part of the record.8
79. Levenson, supra note 53, at 118-19.
80. SEC v. Higashi, 359 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1966); United States v. Steel, 238 F.
Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
81. 359 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1966).
82. 37 Fed. Reg. 25165 (1972), amending 17 C.F.R. § 203.6 (1972). Whether the
Commission will deny a witness's request to purchase a copy of his transcript will depend
upon whether the Commission feels that the copy of the testimony will be used to defeat
the discovery of essential facts in the investigation, e.g., the transcript being made avail-
able to the persons whose activities are the subject of the investigation. Id. The Com-
mission's denial is authorized by the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 555(c)
(1970), and was upheld in Commercial Capital Corp. v. SEC, 360 F.2d 856 (7th Cir.
1966).




The Commission, after a review of the investigation proceedings,
may issue an order for an administrative hearing."4 In this hearing, the
division of the' Commission which conducted the investigation seeks to
establish violations of law against individuals or companies and to have
administrative sanctions imposed against such offenders.85 This hearing
is conducted like a nonjury trial, with each party having the right to pre-
sent evidence and testimony and to cross-examine all witnesses.8 6
Notice of the hearing, along with a copy of the order, is given to each
respondent named in the order. The order must contain a short and sim-
ple statement of the matters of fact and law to be determined at the
hearing.87 This order and the notice of hearing, unless otherwise ordered
by the Commission, 8 are given general circulation by release to the public
press.89 Although all quasi-judicial proceedings are public9" unless other-
wise ordered by the Commission,9 when all respondents request that the
hearing be public the Commission has no power to conduct the hearing in
private.92
The hearing is usually held in Washington, D.C. A respondent may
obtain a change of location by application to the Commission if great in-
convenience can be demonstrated." Hearings involving common issues of
fact or law may be consolidated on motion of the parties." If one case is
then dismissed, the hearing continues as to the other cases, subject to a
motion to strike irrelevant and immaterial evidence. 5
The hearings are conducted by a hearing officer, a Commission em-
ployee who has the title of "administrative law judge" and who serves in-
84. The Commission is also empowered, either as an alternative to an administrative
hearing or in addition thereto, to bring an action in federal district court to enjoin viola-
tions of the securities statutes, or may transmit its evidence to the United States Attorney
General who may, in his discretion, institute criminal proceedings. Securities Act of 1933,
15 U.S.C. § 77t(a)-(b) (1970); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(a), (e)
(1970).
85. SowARDs, supra note 47, at § 1.03[2][c].
86. 17 C.F.R. § 201.14(a) (1972); R.P. 14(a).
87. 17 C.F.R. § 201.6(a) (1972); R.P. 6(a). The copy of the order is routinely pro-
vided as a matter of practice, although the rule does not require it.
88. 17 C.F.R. § 201.6(c) (1972); R.P. 6(c).
89. Id. In certain proceedings parties may request that the notice and other papers be
kept confidential, and the Commission, in its discretion, may grant the request. 17 C.F.R.
§ 201.25 (1972); R.P. 25.
90. Id.
91. 17 C.F.R. § 201.11(b) (1972); R.P. 11(b).
92. 17 C.F.R. § 201.25 (1972); R.P. 25.
93. 17 C.F.R. § 201.6(b) (1972); R.P. 6(b). Additionally, judicial relief from un-
reasonable subpoenas can be obtained. E.g., Bank of America v. Douglas, 105 F.2d 100
(D.C. Cir. 1939).
94. 17 C.F.R. § 201.10 (1972); R.P. 10. John A. Kaye, 22 S.E.C. 632 (1946).
95. Charles A. Massie, 22 S.E.C. 857 (1946).
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dependently of the office or division responsible for prosecuting the case."
The hearing officer passes on all interlocutory motions and on the admissi-
bility of evidence.97 He may certify an interlocutory question to the Com-
mission for its review only under specified circumstances."8
2. Who May Participate in the Hearing
Any party respondent must file notice of appearance with the Com-
mission within 15 days after service of the order or be considered in de-
fault. 9 Where a default occurs, the matter contained in the order may be
taken as established and findings of fact and law may be entered.' 0
In addition to the original parties (i.e., the division of the Commis-
sion which is prosecuting and the named respondents), any person who
may be affected by an order may request the privilege to intervene and
to be heard. The determination of whether a person should be allowed to
intervene is at the complete discretion of the Commission and may not be
appealed to the federal courts.'0 ' However, any interested governmental
agency-local, state, or federal-is entitled to become a party to such
proceedings merely by filing a notice of appearance. 2 The conduct of the
case, regardless of any intervention, remains within the control of the
original named parties.'0 If the intervenor, upon written application, can
demonstrate to the Commission's satisfaction that leave to be heard is
inadequate and that his full participation is in the public interest, he may
be permitted to participate as a party.' The Commission may at any
time review the order of the hearing officer allowing intervention, and
modify it in any way it sees fit.'05
In addition to allowing intervention, the hearing officer may allow a
person who has not filed for intervention to state his views at the hear-
ing.'0 0 However, such statements are not considered independently as
evidence unless offered and admitted as evidence of the truth of the state-
ments therein made.'0 7
96. 17 C.F.R. § 201.11(b) (1972); R.P. 11(b). This rule was amended on September
27, 1972, changing the designation of "hearing examiner" to that of "administrative law
judge." 37 Fed. Reg. 23826 (1972), amending 17 C.F.R. § 201.11(b) (1972).
97. 37 Fed. Reg. 23826 (1972), amending 17 C.F.R. § 201.11(e) (1972).
98. 17 C.F.R. § 201.12(a) (1972); R.P. 12(a).
99. 17 C.F.R. § 201.6(e) (1972); R.P. 6(e).
100. Id.
101. 17 C.F.R. § 201.9(c) (1972); R.P. 9(c); Okin v. SEC, 143 F.2d 960 (2d Cir.
1944).
102. 17 C.F.R. § 201.9(a) (1972); R.P. 9(a); see, e.g., The Middle West Corp., 11 S.E.C.
355 (1942).
103. 17 C.F.R. § 201.9(d) (1972); R.P. 9(d).
104. 17 C.F.R. § 201.9(e) (1972); R.P. 9(e).
105. 17 C.F.R. § 201.9(h) (1972) ; R.P. 9(h).
106. 17 C.F.R. § 201.9(f) (1972) ; R.P. 9(f).
107. Id.
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3. Discovery by the Parties
The parties are allowed to preserve testimony either by oral deposi-
tion1°8 or by written interrogatory,'019 upon a showing to the hearing
officer that the witness may not or will not be able to attend the hearing,
that his testimony is material to the proceeding, and that in the interest of
justice his deposition should be taken.110 The request to take a deposition
must be in writing and must specify the matters to which the witness will
testify, and the time and place proposed for the taking of the deposition."'
Formerly, a party was provided no right to discover any part of the
Commission's case." Now, however, the hearing officer may, at his discre-
tion, and either at the request of any party or sua sponte, order the in-
terested division to furnish any or all of the following: An outline of its
case or defense, the legal theories upon which it will rely, the identity of
wisnesses who will testify on its behalf, and copies of or a list of the docu-
ments which it intends to introduce at the hearing.1  In a proceeding in-
volving more than one respondent the administrative law judge may, at
his discretion, require the Commission staff to indicate the respondent
against whom evidence will be presented, and this must be done at least
one day prior to the presentation of that evidence.1'4
After a witness who has been called by the interested division has
given direct testimony, any party may request and obtain the production
of any statement of such witness pertaining to his direct testimony which
is in the possession of the interested division."' It should be noted, how-
ever, that even this right to review statements is strictly limited to matters
covered in the witness's direct testimony before the hearing officer and
applies only after the witness has testified."'
4. Pleadings
A respondent is not required to answer the order of the Commission
unless the order specifically directs that an answer be made."7 If an
108. 17 C.F.R. § 201.15(a) (1972); R.P. 15(a).
109. 17 C.F.R. § 201.15(g) (1972); R.P. 15(g).
110. 17 C.F.R. § 201.15(a) (1972); R.P. 15(a).
111. Id.
112. Steadman Security Corp. v. SEC, [1972-73 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 93,735 (D.D.C. 1973). The court held that the documents requested by plaintiffs,
who were respondents in an administrative proceeding before the Commission, were in-
vestigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes and therefore exempt from dis-
closure under the Freedom of Information Act. The district court also held that it had no
jurisdiction to review the administrative law judge's denial of plaintiffs' request for dis-
closure.
113. 37 Fed. Reg. 23827 (1972), amending 17 C.F.R. § 201.8(d) (1972).
114. 37 Fed. Reg. 23827 (1972), amending 17 C.F.R. § 201.11(d) (1972).
115. 17 C.F.R. § 201.11.1 (1972); R.P. 11.1. This right is further expressly limited by
all of the applicable provisions of the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970).
116. 17 C.F.R. § 20.11.1 (1972) ; R.P. 11.1.
117. 17 C.F.R. § 201.7(a) (1972); R.P. 7(a).
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answer is required, it must be filed within 15 days after service of the
order upon the respondent."" The answer must admit, deny, or state that
the party does not have and is unable to obtain sufficient information to
admit or deny, each allegation in the order."' A statement of lack of in-
formation is taken as a denial,.2 and any allegation which is not denied
is taken as admitted.' Failure to timely file a required answer results in
the respondent being deemed to be in default. 2 ' The proceeding then may
be determined against him by the Commission upon consideration of the
order alone, the allegations of which may be deemed to be true. 23
While a party has had the right to file a motion for a more definite
statement of specified matters of fact or law to be considered or deter-
mined, 24 a review of the Commission's decisions reveals that in the past
the chances for getting a more definite statement were almost nonexist-
ent.125 However, the Rules of Practice have been amended to make it
clear that the hearing officer may, in appropriate cases, require pretrial
discovery. 2 The Commission's position has been that a respondent is en-
titled to be sufficiently informed of the charges against him so that he
may adequately prepare his defense, but that he is not entitled, as a mat-
ter of right, to disclosure of evidence in advance of the hearing. 27 In its
release announcing the amendment to Rule 8(d),128 the Commission in-
dicated that it now favors a more liberal treatment of parties' motions for
more definite statements under Rule 7 (d).129
It should be noted that, for all the suggestive language in its release,
the Commission declined to require pre-hearing disclosure by the parties,
and the Commission also failed to implement in its administrative pro-
ceedings the pre-hearing disclosure of exculpatory evidence, as required
in the federal trial courts under the rules of Brady v. Maryland and Giles
v. Maryland.'30
118. 17 C.F.R. § 201.7(b) (1972); R.P. 7(b). The period may be altered by rule or
by order. Id.
119. 17 C.F.R. § 201.7(c) (1972); R.P. 7(c).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. 17 C.F.R. § 201.7(e) (1972) ; R.P. 7(e).
123. 17 C.F.R. § 201.7(e) (1972); R.P. 7(e). E.g., Diversified Sec. Corp., SEC Securi-
ties Exchange Act Release No. 7489 (Dec. 23, 1964).
124. 17 C.F.R. § 201.7(d) (1972); R.P. 7(d).
125. 3 L. Loss, SEcuiuTms REGuLATIoN 1904 (2d ed. 1961). See, e.g., Sterling Sec. Co.,
37 S.E.C. 825 (1957); Charles C. Wright, 1 S.E.C. 482 (1936).
126. See note 109 supra and accompanying text.
127. Charles M. Weber, 35 S.E.C. 79 (1953); Michael J. Meehan, 1 S.E.C. 238 (1935).
128. 37 Fed. Reg. 23827 (1972), amending 17 C.F.R. § 201.8(d) (1972).
129. 17 C.F.R. § 201.7(d) (1972).
130. 373 U.S. 83 (1963); 386 U.S. 66 (1967). Such pre-hearing disclosure has been
advocated by the Administrative Conference of the United States, DISCOVERY IN AGENCY
ADJUDICATION, 1 RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF
THE UTED STATES, January 8, 1968-June 30, 1970, Recommendation No. 21, at 571 (1971),
and by the practicing securities bar, Mathews, A Practitioner's Comments on SEC En-
forcement Policies, Practices and Procedures, in CHANGES IN SECURrrms LAw ENFORCE-
MENT Am LrIGATION 89, 100-06 (N.Y.L.J. 1972).
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The hearing officer, for cause shown, may grant a motion for an
amendment to the matters to be considered at the hearing at any time
after the commencement of the hearing and prior to the filing of an ini-
tial decision, or, if no initial decision is to be filed, prior to the time fixed
for the filing of final briefs with the Commission.' 8 ' The Commission may,
at any time, allow an amendment to the matters to be considered. 182 As a
general rule, the Commission staff will file a motion to amend with the
hearing officer when the proposed new matter is within the framework of
the original order for proceedings issued by the Commission. If the
amendment seeks to add new matter which is not within the scope of the
original order, the staff will submit its motion to amend to the Commis-
sion. 88 In the opinion of one authority, the possibility of unfair surprise
due to this liberal amendment procedure is softened by the Commission's
practice of granting continuances where bona fide -surprise to a party re-
sults from an amendment1. 4
5. Settlements
At any time during the course of the proceedings, a party may sub-
mit an offer of settlement, in writing, to the interested division of the
Commission. The interested division presents the offer of settlement to
the Commission when its recommendation is favorable. However, when
the recommendation is unfavorable, it will present the settlement offer to
the Commission only if the party making the offer so requests. If the in-
terested parties agree and so request, the hearing officer may express his
views regarding the appropriateness of any settlement offer. The request
for such an expression of opinion by the hearing officer constitutes a
waiver by the parties of any right to claim prejudgment by the hearing
officer based upon the views he expresses. The hearing officer has the dis-
cretion as to whether to express his views on a settlement offer. The Com-
mission, if it deems it appropriate, may allow the party making the offer
the opportunity to make an oral presentation to the Commission on the
offer. When the Commission rejects a settlement offer, the offer is deemed
131. 37 Fed. Reg. 23827 (1972), amending 17 C.F.R. § 201.6(d) (1972).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. GADsBY, supra note 49, at § 9.02[2][a][i]. Extension of Time and Adjournments,
17 C.F.R. § 201.13 (1972), was amended on Sept. 27, 1972, as follows: paragraph (b) was
deleted, and paragraph (c) was redesignated as paragraph (b) and was amended to read:
(b) Limitations on postponements and adjournments. A hearing before a
hearing officer shall begin at the time and place ordered by the Commission, pro-
vided that, within the limits provided by statute, the hearing officer may for
good cause postpone the commencement of the hearing for a reasonable period of
time or change the place of hearing. Any convened hearing may be adjourned to
such time and place as may be ordered by the Commission or by the hearing
officer. It is the policy of the Commission that such postponements or adjourn-
ments should normally not exceed 30 days. If the hearing officer orders a post-
ponement or an adjournment for a period exceeding 30 days, the reasons for so
doing shall be stated in his order.
37 Fed. Reg. 23827, 23829 (1972), amending 17 C.F.R. § 201.13 (1972).
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withdrawn, and the offer and any document relating thereto is not in-
cluded in the record of the proceedings. The acceptance by the Commis-
sion of an offer of settlement is not final unless it is made in its formal
findings and opinion issued on the proceedings.18 5
6. Proof and Evidence
The hearing officer rules on all matters of admissibility of evi-
dence. O The common law rules of evidence have only limited applica-
tion to the hearing. 8 While immaterial and irrelevant material should be
excluded by the hearing officer, the admission of such evidence does not
constitute grounds for reversal of a finding of fact or law made by him
if, on the whole, the order was based on and supported by such relevant
and material evidence as a "reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion."'8 8 However, the administrative findings may not
be based exclusively on uncorroborated hearsay.'89
7. The Hearing Officer's Order and Commission Review
A motion to dismiss the Commission's case may be made at the end
of the Commission's staff's case or at the end of the proceedings.'"4
At the end of the hearing, the hearing officer consults with the parties
and determines the period in which the parties will have to file proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law for the hearing officer's considera-
tion. 4' These proposed findings and conclusions, supported by citations
to authority and by argument, are usually required to be filed within 30
days after the conclusion of the hearing.'42 The parties' proposed findings
and conclusions may be accepted or rejected, in whole or in part, by the
hearing officer, or not considered at all in arriving at his opinion.
The record of the hearing is served upon the hearing officer promptly
after the end of the period allowed for the filing of the party's proposed
findings and conclusions. 48 The hearing officer must file his initial de-
cision with the Secretary of the Commission within 30 days after service
135. 37 Fed. Reg. 23827 (1972), amending 17 C.F.R. § 201.8(a) (1972).
136. 3 L. Loss, SEcURITrEs REGULATION 1908 (2d ed. 1961).
137. FTC v. Cement Institute, 33 U.S. 683 (1948); Archer v. SEC, 133 F.2d 795 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 767 (1943).
138. Willaport Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, 174 F.2d 676, 691 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338
U.S. 860 (1949) quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
139. American Natural Gas Co., 36 S.E.C. 387 (1955). See also Bridges v. Wixon, 326
U.S. 135 (1945).
140. 37 Fed. Reg. 23827 (1972), amending 17 C.F.R. § 201.11(e) (1972).
141. 17 C.F.R. § 201.16(d)-(e) (1972); R.P. 16(d)-(e).
142. 37 Fed. Reg. 23827 (1972), amending 17 C.F.R. § 201.16(e) (1972). This amend-
ment eliminated the 60 day maximum time within which the hearing officer could allow
the first filing, substituting a recommended 30 days with discretion to allow any additional
time, provided the officer recites his reasons in the order setting the time for briefs.
143. 17 C.F.R. § 201.16(f) (1972); R.P. 16(f).
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upon him of the hearing record.' During the 30-day period in which the
hearing officer has to write his opinion, the parties may request, or the
hearing officer may request of the parties, additional oral argument on
the subject matter of the hearing, which takes place at his discretion. 45
The hearing officer's initial decision must include findings and con-
clusions, with the reasons therefor, upon all material issues of fact, law
and discretion presented in the record. The decision must also contain
an appropriate order and a statement of the rules governing appeals from
the order. 46
The initial decision may be reviewed by the Commission either upon
petition filed by a party within 15 days of service of the decision on the
party, 4 7 or upon the Commission's own order, made within 30 days after
service of the decision on all parties. 4 A petition for review must contain
specific exceptions to the findings and conclusions of the hearing officer's
order and state the reasons for such exceptions. 49 Any exception omitted
from the petition is waived and may be disregarded by the Commission
on review. 5 ° The Commission may decline to grant a petition for re-
view. 15'
The petitioner and those other parties supporting reversal or modi-
fication of the decision must file briefs with the Commission within 30
days after the Commission's order granting review."' All other parties
must file their reply briefs within 30 days after service of the original
briefs. 53 When the Commission orders review on its own motion, all
briefs are due within 30 days of service of the order of review. 4 Any




145. 17 C.F.R. § 201.16(g) (1972); R.P. 16(g).
146. 17 C.F.R. § 201.16(a) (1972); R.P. 16(a);
147. 17 C.F.R. § 201.17(b) (1972); R.P. 17(b). "Substantial compliance" with time
periods is required. Breeze Corps., 3 S.E.C. 709 (1949).
148. 17 C.F.R. § 201.17(c) (1972); R.P. 17(c).
149. 17 C.F.R. § 201.17(b) (1972) ; R.P. 17(b). Lack of specificity and failure to
file a satisfactory petition will result in the affirmance of the original decision. See, e.g.,
Broadwall Sec., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7556 (Mar. 12, 1965).
150. 17 C.F.R. § 201.17(b) (1972); R.P. 17(b).
151. 17 C.F.R. § 201.17(d) (1972); RP. 17(d). However, this rule provides that re-
view will be ordered where the initial decision involves: suspension, denial or revocation of
a broker-dealer registration; suspension, denial or withdrawal of any registration; suspen-
sion or expulsion of a member of a national exchange; or suspension of trading.
Review will also be ordered if the petition makes a reasonable showing (1) of pre-
judicial error, or (2) that the initial decision embodies (a) a clearly erroneous finding or
conclusion of a material fact, or (b) an erroneous legal conclusion, or (c) an act of dis-
cretion or decision of importance that should be reviewed. Id.
152. 17 C.F.R. § 201.17(e)(1) (1972); R.P. 17(e)(1). The briefs may exceed sixty
pages in length only with permission of the Commission. 37 Fed. Reg. 23827 (1972),
amending 17 C.F.R. § 201.22(d) (1972).
153. 17 C.F.R. § 201.17(e)(1) (1972); R.P. 17(e)(1).
154. 17 C.F.R. § 201.17(e) (2) (1972); R.P. 17(e) (2).
155. Id. Untimely filed briefs will be received only upon special permission of the
Commission. 17 C.F.R. § 201.18 (1972) ; R.P. 18.
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The scope of the Commission's review is limited to the matters
specified in the order for review.56 However, the Commission, with ap-
propriate notice to the parties, may revise that order and raise and
determine any other matters which it deems material. The parties are
afforded sufficient opportunity to brief and prepare for argument on such
additional points." 7 The Commission will generally grant oral argument
on review upon the written request of any party. 58
After the Commission renders an opinion and order in the matter
reviewed, any party can move for a rehearing within 10 days from the
entry of the Commission's order and opinion.'
8. Appeal from Commission Orders
Any party 60 who considers himself aggrieved by a Commission order
may appeal from that order to the federal court of appeals either in the
circuit in which the party resides or in the District of Columbia.' 6' The
petition for appeal must be filed within 60 days after entry of the Com-
mission order complained of or within 60 days after entry of an order
by the Commission denying a petition for rehearing. 6 This appeal time
is jurisdictional and may not be extended by the federal court.'
The order of the Commission appealed from must be a final order,
as that term is used in the federal rules of civil procedure. Thus, orders
initiating preliminary investigations and the like do not sufficiently "ag-
grieve" parties so as to make appeal proper, regardless of adverse pub-
licity and loss of time resulting from such orders.6 4 In considering the
appeal, the court of appeals will use such well-established principles of
administrative law as the "substantial evidence" rule, the "relevance of
administrative history and practice" rule, and the "right of an agency
to select its own remedy" rule. 5
156. 17 C.F.R. § 201.17(g)(1) (1972); R.P. 17(g)(1).
157. Id.
158. 17 C.F.R. § 201.21(a) (1972) ; R.P. 21(a).
159. 17 C.F.R. § 201.21(e) (1972); R.P. 21(e). Specificity in the petition as to matter
sought to be reheard is essential. Id.
160. Wallach v. SEC, 206 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1953). No one has the right to appeal
unless he has been a party respondent to the proceedings.
161. 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a) (1970).
162. Samuel B. Franklin & Co. v. SEC, 290 F.2d 719 (9th Cir. 1961), construing §
25(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a) (1970).
163. Columbia Oil & Gas Corp. v. SEC, 134 F.2d 265 (3d Cir. 1943).
164. Stardust, Inc. v. SEC, 225 F.2d 255 (9th Cir. 1955); Okin v. SEC, 143 F.2d 943
(2d Cir. 1944). But see Medical Committee for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659
(D.C. Cir. 1970) (appeal proper where Commission action dispositive of proceeding with-
out formal order).
165. Capital Funds, Inc. v. SEC, 348 F.2d 582 (8th Cir. 1965); Archer v. SEC, 133
F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1943) ; GADsBY, supra note 49, at § 9.02[2][c].
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E. CONCLUSION
In its report dated June 1, 1972, the Advisory Committee on En-
forcement Policies and Practices, which was appointed to review and
evaluate the Commission's enforcement policies and practices, made
several recommendations designed to afford persons under investigation
by the Commission an opportunity, through formal procedures, to present
their position to the Commission prior to the authorization of an enforce-
ment proceeding.166 The Committee's recommendations, in general, would
have required that a prospective defendant or respondent be given notice
of the Commission staff's charges and proposed enforcement recommenda-
tion, and be given an opportunity to submit a written statement to the
Commission which would accompany the staff's recommendation. While
the Securities Act of 1933167 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934168
provide that the Commission, in its discretion, can require or permit a
person under investigation to file a written statement concerning the
matter under investigation, the Commission and its staff generally elect to
keep secret the subject matter of the investigation and the persons under
investigation. The objective of the recommended procedure was to allow
the Commission the benefit of both the staff's and the adverse party's
contentions concerning the matters involved in the staff's enforcement
recommendation, prior to the Commission's authorizing an enforcement
proceeding. While the Commission agreed with the objective of the recom-
mendations, it declined to adopt formal rules embodying the Committee's
recommendations, stating that "it believes it necessary and proper that
the objective be attained, where practicable, on a strictly informal basis
in accordance with procedures which are now generally in effect."' 69
Under present procedure, the decision as to whether or not to inform
persons under investigation as to the nature of the charges against them
is left to the discretion of the Commission staff. The Commission should
incorporate the Committee's recommendations into its rules, since such a
procedure would provide the Commission with a more complete presenta-
tion of the matter prior to its having to decide whether to authorize an
enforcement proceeding.
The Committee also recommended to the Commission that it adopt
the practice of notifying a person who is the subject of an investigation
and against whom no further action is contemplated, that the staff has
concluded its investigation of the matters referred to in the investigative
order and has determined that it will not recommend the commencement
166. REPORT OF THE SEC's ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ENFORCEMENT POLICIES AND
PRACTICES (June 1, 1972), in CHANGES IN SECURITIES LAW ENFORCEMENT AND LITIGATION
7, 48 (N.Y.L.J. 1972).
167. 15 U.S.C. § 77t(a) (1970).
168. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (1970).
169. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5310, at 2 (Sept. 27, 1972).
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of an enforcement proceeding against him.17' The Commission declined
to adopt a rule requiring such a procedure in every case, but has instructed
its staff that they have sole discretion to advise a person under investiga-
tion that the formal investigation has been terminated if such advice is
deemed appropriate.17' The Commission has emphasized that such a notice
should not be construed as indicating that the party has been exonerated
or that no action will ever be brought as a result of the staff's investiga-
tion of that particular matter.
The area in most urgent need of revision is that of pre-hearing dis-
closure by the parties of witness lists, copies of documents to be offered
into evidence, copies of witnesses' statements and excupaltory evidence.
In light of the severe sanctions which may be imposed upon respondents
as a result of the Commission's quasi-judicial proceedings, the Commis-
sion should implement rules requiring such pre-hearing disclosure. Under
the present rules, where no such disclosure is required, a respondent is
severely limited in his ability to defend against the Commission's staff's
charges. Such pre-hearing disclosure would not only insure that the person
charged would receive a fair chance to defend himself, but would also
enhance the probability that the full facts of the case would be brought
out in the hearing. Pre-trial disclosure of evidence has proven to be a great
aid to the fair and efficient administration of justice in the federal courts
in both civil and criminal cases, and it is submitted that such pre-hearing
disclosure in SEC proceedings would have the 'same beneficial effect.
The decision as to whether or not to advise a client who has been
subpoenaed to give testimony in an investigation to invoke his fifth
amendment privilege against self incrimination must be made only after
a careful review by counsel of the client's knowledge of the matter under
investigation, the apparent extent of his involvement, and his status as
a registered broker, dealer or representative under the federal securities
acts. Counsel must seek the fullest disclosure from his client concerning
the facts known to the client, since the subpoena to which the witness
must respond states only the name of the persons or companies which
are the subject of the investigation, and then speculate as to the nature
of the suspected objections. The client must be strongly advised that the
purpose of the deposition is to gather evidence as to the existence of
violations of the securities laws, which evidence may well be used in a
subsequent criminal prosecution. A special problem is present when the
client is registered as a broker, dealer or representative under the securi-
ties acts, since failure to cooperate in the SEC investigation or the invok-
ing of the client's fifth amendment right to silence may well jeopardize
his securities license. While the authors, in practice, generally recommend
that the client who is not licensed under the securities acts invoke the fifth
170. REPORT OF THE SEC's ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ENFORCEMENT POLICIES AND
PRACTICES (June 1, 1972), in CHANGE IN SECURITIES LAW ENFORCEMENT AND LITIGATION, 7,
36 (N.Y.L.J. 1972).
171. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5310, at 4 (Sept. 27, 1972).
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amendment in an investigation, it has been their experience that, in many
cases, the licensed client will choose to take the calculated risk of crimi-
nally incriminating himself in order to attempt to preserve his securities
license. Indeed, the securities salesman or broker who is subpoenaed to
testify in an investigation is placed between the proverbial "rock and a
hard place." Thus, it appears that the SEC rules governing investigations
and quasi-judicial proceedings are in need of revision to insure that the
rights of persons involved are adequately protected.
